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ISSUES AND PRELIMINARY RESPONSES
RUSSELL KOROBKIN*
INTRODUCTION
In long-anticipated decisions, the United States Supreme
Court concluded its 1996-97 Term by finding constitutional New
York and Washington state laws that criminalize the act of physi-
cian-assisted suicide ("PAS"). The Court's unanimous rulings in
Vacco v. Quill1 and Washington v. Glucksberg do not pass judgment
on the ethics or desirability of PAS, but merely express a consen-
sus among a jurisprudentially conservative set of Justices that the
United States Constitution has nothing to say about the issue one
way or another. The right to die, so says the Court, is a matter
for the people and their legislatures, not courts, to debate and
resolve. "Throughout the Nation, Americans are engaged in an
earnest and profound debate about the morality, legality, and
practicality of physician-assisted suicide,"3 observed Chief Justice
William Rehnquist writing for the Court. "Our holding permits
this debate to continue, as it should in a democratic society."4
In November, 1997, in the wake of the Supreme Court's
decisions, citizens of Oregon voted to retain that state's "Death
with Dignity Act," an initiative-established PAS law that was nar-
rowly approved by voters in 1994 and tied up in litigation ever
since.5 Oregon was in 1994, and is still today, the only state to
have legalized PAS. It is a fair prediction, though, that Oregon
will not stand alone for long. In the wake of the Supreme
* Assistant Professor, University of Illinois College of Law and University
of Illinois Institute of Government and Public Affairs (IGPA). Many thanks are
due to David Hyman, David Orentlicher, and Tom Ulen for comments on
earlier drafts, and to Vanessa Nogueira for research assistance. Comments may
be directed to the author at korobkin@law.uiuc.edu.
1. 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997).
2. 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
3. Id. at 2275.
4. Id.; see also id. at 2303 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("States are presently
undertaking extensive and serious evaluation of physician-assisted
suicide . . . . the challenging task of crafting appropriate procedures for
safeguarding ... liberty interests is entrusted to the 'laboratory' of the States
. . . .").
5. See, e.g., Judith Graham & Judy Peres, Assisted-Suicide Door Opens Wide,
CH. TRm., Nov. 6, 1997, at 1.
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Court's recent rulings in Glucksberg and Quill, and its decision not
to review a lower court's decision upholding the Constitutionality
of the Oregon Act,6 legislation seeking to legalize PAS will be
proposed and seriously considered during the coming years in
virtually every state.
The question of whether or not PAS is sound policy has
been considered elsewhere in detail and will not be repeated
here. Instead, this article examines the issues that legislation
proposing to legalize PAS must confront. The cliche that "the
devil is in the details" is true nowhere more than it is in the case
of PAS; even if supported in theory by legislative majorities,
"right to die" legislation must resolve a series of complex defini-
tional and implementation issues.
In grappling with these issues, policy makers need not etch
on a clean slate. Oregon's Death with Dignity Act can serve as a
departure for debate, of course, but a surprising number of
other proposals have been put forward as well. During the
course of calendar-year 1997 alone, legislation designed to legal-
ize PAS was introduced in ten other states. Although none of
these bills were voted out of committee, the ten, along with the
Oregon Act (collectively the "state bills"), provide context in
which to explore the legislative issues that PAS raises.7 A review
of these bills suggests that there are four critical sets of primary
issues' that PAS legislation must confront: (1) what role physi-
cians will play in PAS, (2) which patients will qualify for PAS, (3)
which physicians may aid a patient requesting PAS, and (4) what
procedures patients and physicians must follow before PAS can
be granted. All of the bills confront these issues to some degree,
but none adequately resolve all of the difficult implementation
issues. The state bills, then, should serve simultaneously as exam-
ples of how to and how not to establish a PAS regime. They should
provide guidance for future legislative initiatives, but none
should be seen as a perfected model.
6. See Lee v. Harcleroad, 118 S. Ct. 328 (1997), denying cert. to Lee v.
Oregon, 107 F. 3d 1382 (9th Cir. 1997) (upholding the constitutionality of the
Oregon Death With Dignity Act).
7. In 1998, prior to this article going to press, bills that would legalize
physician-assisted suicide were introduced in at least two additional states. See
H.B. 1433, 155th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.H. 1998); S.B. 2869, 1997-98 Leg. Sess.
(R.I. 1998). These bills do not differ significantly from the bills introduced in
10 states in 1997 that are analyzed in detail in this article.
8. There are also a number of important secondary issues, such as how to
monitor and enforce the law's boundaries, but these will not be considered in
this article.
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I. PHYSICIAN INVOLVEMENT IN DEATH
The most fundamental issue that "right to die" legislation
must confront is whether it will be limited to PAS, in which the
physician prescribes a lethal dose of medication but the patient
must self-administer the dose, or extend to active voluntary
euthanasia, in which the physician may administer the lethal
dose to the patient who requests death, most likely in the form of
a lethal injection. The more limited right to PAS is what the
plaintiffs in Glucksberg and Quill sought; the latter is officially con-
doned (although technically illegal) in the Netherlands.9
The arguments for limiting legislation to PAS tend to be
pragmatic in nature.10 Legalizing voluntary euthanasia (rather
than just PAS) would substantially raise the risk that individuals
who do not want to die (or, at least, do not express a preference
for dying) would be put to death by mistake. Legalizing volun-
tary euthanasia would also increase the risk of coercion or out-
right murder of the ill and/or the elderly by rendering it difficult
to distinguish involuntary deaths from those that were truly vol-
untary." The argument for permitting voluntary euthanasia in
addition to PAS, in contrast, rests largely on the theoretical prin-
ciple of horizontal equity-that individuals in "like" circum-
stances should be treated alike by the law. PAS, by its nature, is
restricted to those who are not so ill or incapacitated that they
are unable to self-administer the lethal medication. Legalizing
PAS but not voluntary euthanasia could be viewed as discriminat-
ing against incapacitated individuals, even though they have a
moral claim to the right to end their lives that is equally strong
(or perhaps even stronger, due to their incapacity) as that of
individuals who are not incapacitated.
To date, the pragmatic arguments have prevailed over the
theoretical. Of the eleven state bills, ten limit the right to die to
PAS, and most of these explicitly state that they do not condone
or authorize lethal injection, mercy killing, or active euthana-
9. See generally John Keown, Euthanasia in the Netherlands: Sliding Down the
Slippery Slope?, in EUTHANASIA EXAMINED: ETHICAL, CLINICAL AND LEGAL
PERSPECTIVES 261 (John Keown ed., 1995) [hereinafter EUTHANASIA EXAMINED].
10. That is, those who oppose active voluntary euthanasia on moral or
ethical grounds tend to opposed PAS also and on the same or similar grounds.
11. See, e.g., Keown, supra note 9, at 262 (describing the argument that a
line between voluntary and involuntary euthanasia would be difficult to
maintain in practice); Charles H. Baron et al., A Model State Act to Authorize and
Regulate Physician-Assisted Suicide, 33 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 10 (1996) (arguing
that restricting legislation to PAS provides "a stronger assurance of the patient's
voluntary resolve to die").
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sia. 12 The Nebraska bill stands out as distinctly different from
the other ten by explicitly permitting voluntary euthanasia. It
provides that an individual may provide an "advanced directive"
that requests aid-in-dying if he or she becomes terminally ill. 3
"Aid-in-dying" is in turn defined as "the administration by a phy-
sician of a lethal injection or a lethal dose of medication
that . . . will terminate the life of the declarant in a painless,
humane, and dignified manner."1 4 The overwhelming support
among the state bills for the more limited right to PAS likely
reflects a political calculation that the more limited right would
generate greater public support. Oregon's Death with Dignity
Act as originally drafted would have permitted active voluntary
euthanasia, but this provision was dropped by supporters of the
initiative, apparently out of fear that it would jeopardize the initi-
ative's chance of passage.1 5
II. QUALIFYING PATIENTS
A. Health Status
In Glucksberg and Quill, the plaintiffs seeking to overturn the
Washington and New York laws prohibiting PAS alleged that they
were "terminally ill;" that is, that they were told by their doctors
that they had only a short time to live.' 6 In fact, none of the
patients who were plaintiffs when either case was filed survived to
hear the Supreme Court render its decisions in those cases.17
But there is, of course, nothing inherent in the concept of PAS
that requires the practice be limited to the terminally ill.18 In
theory, PAS could be made available to all individuals who decide
they would prefer death to life, or it could be circumscribed in
some way but offered to a broader class of individuals than the
12. See OR. REv. STAT. § 127.880 (1995); H.B. 2204, 19th Leg., Reg. Sess.
§ 17 (Haw. 1997); H.B. 691, 90th Gen. Assembly, 1997-98 Reg. Sess. § 5 (Ill.
1997); H.P. 663, 118th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. § 5-917(a) (Me. 1997); S.B. 81, 89th
Leg., 1997 Reg. Sess. § 8(29) (Mich. 1997); H.B. 109, 64th Biennial Sess. § 2
(Vt. 1997); S.B. 5654, 55th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. § 23 (Wash. 1997). The Maine
bill somewhat contradictorily suggests that a patient who cannot self-administer
medication may elect another person to "assist in the administration of
medication." Me. H.P. 663 § 5-917(b).
13. See L.B. 406, 95th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. §§ 3(3), 3(11) (Neb. 1997).
14. Id. § 3(1).
15. See Rita L. Marker & Wesley J. Smith, The Art of Verbal Engineering, 35
DuQ. L. REv. 81, 88 (1996).
16. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2261 n.4 (1997); Quill
v. Vacco, 117 S. Ct. 2293, 2296 n.4 (1997).
17. See Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2261; Quill, 117 S. Ct. at 2296.
18. See, e.g., Yale Kamisar, Physician-Assisted Suicide: The Last Bridge to Active
Voluntary Euthanasia, in EUTHANASIA EXAMINED, supra note 9, at 225, 234.
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terminally ill. Limiting a right to PAS to terminally ill patients, at
a minimum, raises questions of fairness for chronically - but not
terminally-ill patients, especially those experiencing a good
deal of suffering as a result of their illnesses.
Model legislation proposed by a group of academicians (the
"Harvard Model Law" or "HML") proposes that PAS be available
to patients with either a terminal illness or an "intractable and
unbearable illness."19 It defines the latter as a "bodily disorder
(1) that cannot be cured or successfully palliated, and (2) that
causes such severe suffering that a patient prefers death."2
While this approach makes an effort to address the equitable
claims of the chronically ill to the same treatment as the termi-
nally ill, it does so at the cost of creating a more vague standard
for determining which patients are eligible for PAS.
Notwithstanding the academic support for an expansion of
PAS to this broader class of individuals, all eleven state bills
explicitly limit the availability of PAS to the terminally ill. Most
of these (Oregon, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Maine, Nebraska, Wis-
consin) define "terminal illness" as a condition that will lead to
death within six months, according to reasonable medical predic-
tion.21 Vermont defines a terminal illness as one that will lead to
death within a year;22 Washington defines such an illness as one
that will lead to death within a "reasonable period of time;"2 and
Illinois calls a terminal illness one in which "death is
imminent."24
As a precaution designed to avoid errant medical determina-
tions that a patient's illness is terminal when in fact there is hope
for recovery, all except the Nebraska bill require that, in addi-
tion to the patient's treating physician diagnosing the patient's
illness as "terminal" under the statute, the treating physician
refer the patient to a second "consulting" physician to confirm
the terminal nature of the diagnosis. The Massachusetts bill, per-
haps in a fit of excessive caution, requires a third confirming
opinion as to the terminal nature of the patient's illness.25
19. Baron et al., supra note 11, at 26.
20. Id. at 25.
21. See OR. R.v. STAT. § 127.800 (1995); H.B. 2204, 19th Leg., Reg. Sess.
§ 1 (Haw. 1997); H.P. 663, 118th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. § 5-902(o) (Me. 1997);
H.B. 1543, 181st Gen. Court, 1997 Reg. Sess. § 12DD(i) (Mass. 1997); S.B. 81,
89th Leg., 1997 Reg. Sess. § 8(30)(H) (Mich. 1997); L.B. 406, 95th Leg., 1st
Reg. Sess. § 3(11) (Neb. 1997); A.B. 32, 93rd Reg. Sess. § 156.01(17) (Wis.
1997).
22. See H.B. 109, 64th Biennial Sess. § 5280(11) (Vt. 1997).
23. S.B. 5654, 55th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. § 3(8) (Wash. 1997).
24. H.B. 691, 90th Gen. Assembly, 1997-98 Reg. Sess. § 10 (11. 1997).
25. See Mass. H.B. 1543 § 12GG(a).
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B. Age of the Patient
All eleven state bills further limit the class of citizens eligible
for PAS by specifying that the terminally ill must reach a certain
age before qualifying for the procedure. Nine of the bills place
the age of consent at 18 (Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine,
Michigan, Oregon, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin),
although Illinois would permit an exception for a minor who is
legally emancipated.2 6 Nebraska would require a patient to be
19 years-old or emancipated,2 7 and Massachusetts would require
a patient to have reached the age of 21.28
Importantly, none of the bills specifies whether a terminally
ill patient who has not reached the age of consent is strictly ineli-
gible for PAS, or whether a legal guardian can provide legally
valid consent. The failure of the legislation to specify any
method by which a minor could become eligible for PAS suggests
a legislative intent to exclude all minors. In at least the Illinois
and Nebraska bills, however, the exceptions to the age of consent
for emancipated minors could be read to imply that parental
consent is possible for those who have not reached the appropri-
ate age, because emancipation laws generally permit a minor to
exercise rights that otherwise may be exercised by her legal
guardian. The Washington bill suggests a contrary position, pro-
viding that a "mentally competent adult eighteen years of age or
older " " may request PAS and then that "no person other than
the qualified patient may request aid in dying for the qualified
patient."'0 Although this language seems to indicate substituted
judgment is prohibited in all cases, it could be read to prohibit
substituted judgment only if the patient is mentally competent
and has reached the age of majority.
C. Mental Competence
Even ardent supporters of PAS agree that the option should
not be available to people who are not mentally competent to
choose it. But how should the law, substantively and procedur-
ally, attempt to guarantee competence? The inability of the cur-
rent bills to resolve this issue suggest both its complexity and a
need for more attention to be devoted to it in future legislative
proposals.
26. See Ill. H.B. 691 § 10.
27. See L.B. 406, 95th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. § 3(2) (Neb. 1997).
28. See Mass. H.B. 1543 § 12EE(b) (1).
29. S.B. 5654, 55th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. § 4(1) (Wash. 1997).
30. Id. § 4(2).
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1. Substantive Standards
Nine of the state bills create a substantive standard that the
patient should not be suffering from a mental disorder or
depression that "impairs"31 or "distorts"3" the patient's judg-
ment.33 Unfortunately, none of these attempts to delineate the
circumstances under which a patient's judgment would be so
impaired or distorted. These "impaired judgment" standards
presumably would disqualify delusional patients with no grasp on
reality from opting for PAS, and they presumably would not dis-
qualify patients who merely suffer some depression as a direct
result of their illnesses (a not unusual circumstance)." But the
bills offer little if any legal guidance as to how medical personnel
should judge circumstances that fall between these polar
extremes. What if the patient who, due to an illness-created
depression, appears to systematically underweight the positive
potential of life but has a general understanding of the pros and
cons of continuing to live?
Leaving determinations of whether a patient suffers from
impaired judgment to mental health professionals is unlikely to
result in a coherent or consistent application of PAS legislation.
Except in extreme cases, even such professionals, have difficulty
determining whether the judgment of seriously medically ill
patients is impaired. 5 The failure of the current crop of bills to
seriously address the parameters of mental competence to
request PAS is perhaps their most serious shortcoming, and
future legislative proposals for PAS should include language that
provides a more explicit and useful legal standard for judging
31. See, e.g., OR. REv. STAT. § 127.825 (1995); H.P. 663, 118th Leg., 2d
Reg. Sess. § 5-906 (Me. 1997).
32. See, e.g., H.B. 691, 90th Gen. Assembly, 1997-98 Reg. Sess. § 25(2) (Ill.
1997).
33. The Washington bill fails to confront the subject of mental
competence at all, an obvious shortcoming in that proposal. The Nebraska bill
seems quite confused on the subject generally. It specifies that only a "mentally
competent" patient may execute an advance directive governing aid-in-dying,
see L.B. 406, 95th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. § 4(1) (Neb. 1997), but does not define
"mentally competent." Further, it permits an attending physician who receives
an aid-in-dying request to request a psychiatric evaluation to determine the
patient's mental competence, see id. § 13, but "mental competence" appears
only to be a requirement at the time the patient issues the advanced directive,
not at the time the physician is asked to provide PAS or euthanasia.
34. A majority of patients suffering from advanced forms of cancer have
been reported to suffer from psychiatric disorders of some kind. See Kathleen
M. Foley, Competent Care for the Dying Instead of Physician-Assisted Suicide, 336 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 54, 56 (1997).
35. See generally Linda Ganzini et al., Attitudes of Oregon Psychiatrists Toward
Physician-Assisted Suicide, 153 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1469 (1996).
1998]
456 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 12
mental competence. Current proposals, if enacted, would consti-
tute legislative abdication to the medical community of what is -
at least in many cases - an ethical determination about what rea-
sons for dying society should validate rather than a medical
judgment.
The Massachusetts bill goes one step beyond the others, pro-
viding that distorted judgment that would prevent a patient from
opting for PAS can be caused not only by mental illness or
depression (or by alcohol or substance abuse), but also by
"homelessness, financial difficulties, or the absence of health
care insurance adequate to defray the cost of continuing health
care."36 This provision raises a troubling question skirted by the
other PAS bills: may a patient opt for PAS in part because he
fears that continuing to live will create a financial burden for his
loved-ones after he dies? It is troubling to think that individuals
will be driven by economic concerns to choose PAS, rather than
concerns with the quality of life and/or of death; on the other
hand, the financial burden that intensive medical care can
impose on those who lack either health insurance or substantial
personal resources is often quite real, and it would be hard to say
that patients who take this into account are behaving irrationally.
Although the Massachusetts bill implicates this issue, a textual
ambiguity leaves uncertain whether the bill resolves it. The bill's
language leaves unclear whether a decision to select PAS due to
financial difficulties constitutes "distorted" judgment under the
bill (and therefore disqualifies the individual from PAS), or
whether financial difficulties are merely a factor that can, in
some circumstances, lead to the "distortion" of the patient's judg-
ment (such that he would be disqualified from receiving PAS).
2. Procedural Protections
Following the Harvard Model Law," a minority of PAS pro-
posals (Illinois, Massachusetts, and Maine) would require that a
patient seeking PAS obtain a consultation with a mental health
professional in order to insure that the patient can pass the
"impaired judgment" standard.3" A majority of existing propos-
als (Connecticut, Hawaii, Michigan, Oregon, Vermont, and Wis-
consin), in contrast, assign to the patient's treating physician the
responsibility of determining whether a mental health consulta-
36. H.B. 1543, 181st Gen. Court, 1997 Reg. Sess. § 12EE(b) (3) (A) (Mass.
1997).
37. See Baron et al., supra note 11, at 29.
38. See H.B. 691, 90th Gen. Assembly, 1997-98 Reg. Sess. § 25(2) (Ill.
1997); H.P. 663, 118th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. § 5-906 (Me. 1997); Mass. H.B. 1543
§ 12GG(b).
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tion is necessary. Most of these bills are drafted to require the
physician to obtain a mental health consultation if he believes a
patient may be suffering from a mental disorder or depression
that is impairing her judgment3 9' Some of the bills specify that
any mental health consult may be with a psychiatrist, clinical psy-
chologist, or social worker,4 ° while others require such a consul-
tation to be with a psychiatrist or psychologist.41 The outlier on
this issue is the Washington bill, which fails to provide explicitly
for a consultation with a mental health professional under any
circumstances - the determination of whether the patient is
mentally competent to request PAS is left to the treating
physicians.
4 2
Requiring mental health consultations for all patients
requesting PAS would, of course, increase the procedural red-
tape that will no doubt accompany PAS. The cautionary argu-
ment for mandatory mental health consultations, however, seems
compelling: a patient's treating physician will often have little or
no training or experience dealing with clinical depression or
other mental health problems, and relying on the judgment of
such physicians concerning whether a mental competence evalu-
ation by a trained professional is necessary would probably sub-
stantially increase the risk that PAS would be granted to
incompetent patients.4" The case for mandatory mental health
consultations is even stronger where proposed legislation formu-
lates a vague substantive standard like "impaired" or "distorted"
judgment that would require medical personnel to exercise a
39. See OR. REv. STAT. § 127.825 (1995); H.B. 6083, 1997 Reg. Sess. § 4(2)
(Conn. 1997); H.B. 2204, 19th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 6 (Haw. 1997); S.B. 81, 89th
Leg., 1997 Reg. Sess. § 8(11) (Mich. 1997); H.B. 109, 64th Biennial Sess. § 5284
(Vt. 1997); A.B. 32, 93rd Reg. Sess. § 156.11 (Wis. 1997). The Maine bill merely
permits (but does not require) the treating physician to refer the patient to a
mental health professional in order to insure that the "impaired judgment" test
is met. See Me. H.P. 663 § 5-906.
40. See Conn. H.B. 6083 § 4(2); Me. H.P. 663 § 5-902(f); Mass. H.B. 1543
§ 12GG(b).
41. See OR. REv. STAT. § 127.800(4); Haw. H.B. 2204 § 1; Mich. S.B. 81
§ 8(11); Vt. H.B. 109 § 5280(3); Wis. A.B. 32 § 156.11. A proposed initiative in
Michigan would require the consultation be with a licensed psychiatrist. See
Mich. Initiative § 5676(2) (c).
42. See S.B. 5654, 55th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. §§ 5(1), 5(4) (Wash. 1997).
43. Cf Y. Conwell & E.D. Caine, Rational Suicide and the Right to Die-Reality
and Myth, 325 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1100 (1991) (reporting that primary care
physicians underdiagnose depression in elderly patients); David Clark, Rational
Suicide and People with Terminal Conditions or Disabilities, 8 IssuEs L. & MED. 147
(1992) (same).
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large amount of discretion in making the required competence
determinations.44
As is the case with the young, none of the eleven state bills
explicitly consider whether patients suffering from impaired
judgment (and are thus ineligible to opt for PAS) are strictly
excluded from receiving PAS, or whether some form of substi-
tuted judgment (provided by a guardian preselected by the
patient or appointed after the patient becomes incompetent) is
possible, although the Washington bill strongly suggests there
can be no substituted judgment.45 Future PAS legislation should
explicitly address this question. The problem, though, lacks a
simple solution. From perspective of horizontal equity, if PAS is
generally available, it would seem unfair to deny some individuals
the right solely because they suffer a mental impairment. On the
other hand, prudence dictates that legislatures exercise extreme
caution when permitting a legal representative of an impaired
patient to request PAS on behalf of the patient. The prospect of
substituted judgment is especially troubling because most repre-
sentatives selected by the patient or appointed by a court likely
would be relatives with a financial interest in the patient's estate,
and therefore have a potential conflict of interest if permitted to
make life and death decisions on the patient's behalf.
D. Residency Requirements
When Oregon voters enacted that state's Death With Dignity
Act, Oregon became the only state to legalize PAS. It was per-
haps not surprising, given this fact, that the Act limited eligibility
for the procedure to residents of the state.4 6 Presumably, the
residency provision was added to the initiative to assuage fears
that Oregon would be flooded with terminally ill patients from
other states who wanted to take advantage of PAS but could not
do so at home. The state bills introduced since the enactment of
the Oregon initiative have split evenly on the question of
whether residency should be required for program eligibility.
The Hawaii, Michigan, Vermont, Wisconsin and Maine bills fol-
low Oregon's lead in restricting eligibility to residents47 ; the
44. Cf Donald H.J. Hermann, The Question Remains: Are There Terminally Ill
Patients Who Have a Constitutional Right to Physician Assistance in Hastening the
Dying Process, 1 DEPAULJ. HEATH CARE L. 445, 490 (1997) (recommending that
PAS legislation require a determination of mental competence by two mental
health specialists).
45. See Wash. S.B. 5654 §§ 4(1), 4(2).
46. See OR. REv. STAT. § 127.800(11).
47. See H.B. 2204, 19th Leg., Reg. Sess. § I (Haw. 1997) (limiting
"qualified patients" to residents of the state); H.P. 663, 118th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess.
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Maine bill would require that a patient reside in the state for six
months prior to being granted PAS, s while the other bills (along
with the Oregon Act) do not themselves specify the requirements
for residency under the law. The Connecticut, Illinois, Massa-
chusetts, Nebraska and Washington bills, following the lead of
the Harvard Model Act, do not contain a residency requirement.
Although a residency requirement is an issue that should be
considered when PAS legislation is drafted, it is not obvious why
a state that wishes to provide the option of PAS to its own citizens
would wish to exclude outsiders, other than as a means of reas-
suring citizens or legislators with strong reservations about PAS
legislation that the procedure would not be administered very
often. Unlike welfare benefits that are funded by the state treas-
ury, PAS does not threaten to have a major fiscal impact on the
state, unless the state decides independently of its decision to
legalize PAS that it will also pay to provide the procedure to some
or all of its citizens."9 It is conceivable that states that enact PAS
legislation might see in influx in the number of terminally ill
patients who would qualify for Medicaid, and thus an impact on
state finances is possible. This potential problem, however,
would seem better addressed through limitations on eligibility
for Medicaid than through limitations on eligibility for PAS.
In addition, residency requirements in this context are con-
stitutionally suspect. Such provisions are almost certain to be
challenged as violating the U.S. Constitution's Privileges and
Immunities Clause,5" and will likely be struck down.
The Supreme Court has established a two-part test for deter-
mining whether a state law that discriminates against non-resi-
dents of the state violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause.
First, courts will consider whether the opportunity denied to
non-residents is one that falls within the scope of the clause. If
the answer is yes, courts will then ask whether the state has a
§ 5-902(n) (Me. 1997); S.B. 81, 89th Leg., 1997 Reg. Sess. § 8(5)(C) (Mich.
1997); A.B. 32, 93rd Reg. Sess. § 156.03 (Wis. 1997).
48. See Me. H.P. 663 § 5-913.
49. The Oregon Health Services Commission recently decided to fund
PAS for its Medicaid clients by categorizing the procedure as covered "comfort
care" treatment for terminal illnesses. See Steve Woodward, Oregon Will Cover
Assisted Suicide, PORTLAND OREGONtAN, Feb. 27, 1998, at Al, available in 1998 WL
4186822. Under a federal law enacted last year, no federal funds may be used
to provide PAS to Medicaid patients. See 42 U.S.C. § 14402 (1994 & Supp. IV
1998).
50. See U.S. CONST. art. IV., § 2, cl. 1 ("The Citizens of each State shall be
entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.").
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substantial interest in treating non-residents differently51 - more
specifically, whether non-residents are a "peculiar source of the
evil at which the statute is aimed." 52 It seems quite unlikely that a
state would be able to demonstrate, under the second prong of
the test, that non-residents requesting PAS might present
problems not caused by residents who might request PAS.
States more plausibly could argue, under the first-prong of
the test, that assisted suicide is not covered by the clause at all.
The Privileges and Immunities Clause does not protect non-resi-
dents from all forms of discrimination-only discrimination in
contexts that are "in their nature, fundamental."53 In attempting
to draw the line between what is sufficiently fundamental for
Privileges and Immunities Clause protection and what is not, the
Supreme Court has held that states cannot require private
employers (even those working under a government contract) to
give hiring preference to residents without running afoul of the
clause, a but they may discriminate against out-of-staters in the
granting of licenses for recreational sports, such as hunting and
fishing,55 and they may restrict welfare benefits to residents.56
An abortion decision is the precedent closest to being on
point. In Doe v. Bolton,57 the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated as a
violation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause a Georgia
requirement that abortions could be performed only if the
woman seeking the procedure was a resident of the state.58
Importantly, the Court did not defend its decision in Bolton on
the unique importance of abortion rights. Rather, it held that
the Privileges and Immunities Clause must "protect persons who
enter Georgia seeking the medical services that are available
there.... A contrary holding would mean that a State could limit
to its own residents the general medical care available within its
borders. This we could not approve."59 PAS, where legal, would
seem to be a "medical service" that, under Bolton, cannot be
restricted to state residents. Since Supreme Court jurisprudence
has clearly established that the Privileges and Immunities Clause
is not so narrow as to require non-discrimination only where con-
51. See generally RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NowAK, 2 TREATISE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE 108 (2d. ed. 1992).
52. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 398 (1948).
53. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823).
54. See United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465
U.S. 208 (1981).
55. See Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371 (1978).
56. See ROTUNDA & NowAI, supra note 51, at 109.
57. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
58. See id. at 183-84.
59. Id. at 200 (emphasis added).
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stitutionally protected rights are at stake,6" the fact that Bolton
dealt with the constitutionally-protected right to abortion
whereas Glucksberg and Quill established that PAS is not constitu-
tionally guaranteed is unlikely to save the legality of PAS resi-
dency requirements.
III. PIYSICIAN QUALIFICATIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
A. The Prescribing Physician
Legislation could reasonably limit the class of physicians per-
mitted to provide PAS. Under one theory, PAS is best provided
by a physician with a long-standing professional relationship with
the patient, ensuring that the physician knows the "whole"
patient, not merely the manifestation of a disease process.61
Under a very different theory, PAS is best provided by physicians
skilled in pain management. One claim levied by some oppo-
nents of PAS is that the practice would be requested only rarely if
terminally ill patients received more skillful treatment for pain.
6 2
This suggests that such limitations on the provision of PAS could
potentially minimize its attractiveness. To date, however, none of
the state bills have limited in any meaningful way the class of
physicians who may respond to a request for PAS. All of the bills
require only that a participating physician be licensed to practice
medicine in the state and have some responsibility for the treat-
ment of the terminally ill patient.6"
A proposed PAS initiative in Michigan, which will be voted
on in that state's November 1998 election, takes a positive
though incomplete step toward ensuring that physicians who par-
ticipate in PAS have at least minimal knowledge of modern
advances in palliative care. The draft initiative provides that two
years after it takes effect physicians that participate in PAS must
complete twenty hours of continuing medical education "in the
60. See ROTUNDA & NOwAK, supra note 51, at 109.
61. See Baron et al., supra note 10, at 17.
62. See, e.g., Robert G. Twycross, Where There is Hope There is Life: A View
from the Hospice, in EUTHANASIA EXAMINED, supra note 9, at 141 (arguing that
adequate pain relief is feasible for virtually all cancer patients, and that among
such patients virtually all requests for PAS are due to treatable depressive
disorders); see also Kamisar, supra note 18, at 235-36; American Medical Ass'n
Council on Scientific Affairs, Good Care of the Dying Patient, 275 JAMA 474, 475
(1996).
63. The Washington bill provides some limitations unrelated to this
specific problem, requiring the "attending physician" to not be related to the
patient, not be entitled to any portion of the patient's estate, and not have any
creditor's claims against the patient. See S.B. 5654, 55th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess.
§§ 3(2) (a)-(c) (Wash. 1997).
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theory and practice of comfort care, hospice care, pain control,
sedation coma, removal of nutrition and hydration, psychiatric
counseling, and the prescription to medications authorized by
this part" in order to renew their licenses,64 as well as four addi-
tional hours of such continuing education at the time of each
subsequent license renewal.65 It is questionable whether these
education requirements are sufficiently stringent, but at the very
least the initiative's requirements should serve as a starting point
for discussion about what specialized training and expertise is
appropriate to require of physicians who participate in PAS.
B. The Qualifications of the Consulting Physician
As discussed above, ten of the state proposals require at least
one "second opinion" to confirm that the patient's condition sat-
isfies the statutory definition of "terminal."66 The majority of
bills provide no firm restrictions on the qualifications of consult-
ing physicians other than that they (like the treating physicians)
be licensed to practice medicine in the state. Consistent with the
obvious purpose of requiring a second opinion, the Oregon,
Connecticut, Hawaii, Maine, Michigan, Vermont, Washington,
and Wisconsin bills would require that the consulting physician
possess "expertise" or experience in treating the disease that has
caused the patient to become terminal and be capable of making
a professional diagnosis, but none of the bills define these
terms.67
The proposed Michigan ballot initiative would provide more
structure to the requirements of expertise and experiences by
requiring that the consulting opinion be provided by a physician
certified as a specialist in the patient's disease by the relevant
specialty board, as well as being currently active in that specialty
area.6" If the patient suffers from cancer, the initiative would
require that the consulting physician be an oncologist.69 This
more specific definition of expertise is desirable because it
removes the uncertainty that would otherwise often surround the
question of whether a given physician had the appropriate exper-
64. Mich. Initiative § 5687(1)
65. See id. § 5687(2).
66. See supra Part II.A.
67. See OR. REv. STAT. § 127.800(3) (1995); H.B. 2204, 19th Leg., Reg.
Sess. § 1 (Haw. 1997); H.P. 663, 118th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. § 5-902(d) (Me.
1997); S.B. 81, 89th Leg., 1997 Reg. Sess. § 8(30)(C) (Mich. 1997); H.B. 109,
64th Biennial Sess. § 5280(2) (Vt. 1997); Wash. S.B. 5654 § 3(3); A.B. 32, 93rd
Reg. Sess. § 156.09 (Wis. 1997).
68. See Mich. Initiative § 5673(D).
69. See id. § 5676(2)(D)
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tise or experience to serve as a consulting physician-uncertainty
that could make potential consulting physicians nervous about
assuming that role and/or attending physicians nervous about
relying on confirming opinions of consulting physicians.
The Maine and Washington legislative proposals provide an
interesting gloss on the role of the consulting physician, perhaps
anticipating that these physicians can provide a check on an
attending physician's potential conflicts of interest in addition to
providing a confirming diagnosis. The Washington bill prohibits
practice partners of the attending physician from serving as a
consulting physician (although the two physicians may be mem-
bers of the same health maintenance organization) v° while the
Maine bill provides that the consulting physician "may not be a
partner or similar business associate of the attending physician"
or even 'have an office in the same building as the attending
physician."71
C. Physician Presence at the Time of Death
Dedication to the value of patient care and comfort suggests
that the physician who prescribes the lethal dose of medication
be permitted to be present when the patient takes her own life.7 2
On the other hand, permitting physicians to be present at the
time of death risks subtle (and perhaps not so subtle) coercion of
patients who have an eleventh-hour inclination to reconsider has-
tening their deaths. Furthermore, physician attendance at the
patient's bedside at the time the patient's life is taken could eas-
ily blur the line between PAS and voluntary euthanasia. Despite
the firm desire of most of the state bills to prohibit voluntary
euthanasia, none of the bills that explicitly address this issue have
opted to preclude the attending physician from witnesses a
patient's death. Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan,
and Vermont provide that the physician may be present at the
time of death.7" Following the Harvard Model Law,7" Connecti-
70. See Wash. S.B. 5654 § 3(3)(d).
71. Me. H.P. 663 § 5-902(d).
72. See Baron et al., supra note 10, at 21 ("We hope that the responsible
physician will be present at the patient's death in order to reassure the patient
and to make certain that the process is carried out effectively.")..
73. See H.B. 1543, 181st Gen. Court, 1997 Reg. Sess. § 12EE(c) (Mass.
1997) (providing that the responsible physician "may, if the patient so requests,
be present at the time that the patient makes use of the means [of death]");
S.B. 81, 89th Leg., 1997 Reg. Sess. § 8(21) (Mich. 1997) (providing that "a
person" shall not be subject to liability for "being present when an individual
takes medication prescribed to end his or her life ..
74. See Baron et al., supra note 10, at 27.
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cut, Illinois and Massachusetts go so far as to state that the physi-
cian may "assist" the patient in making use of the means to
hasten death, so long as the "actual use" is a "voluntary physical
act" of the patient.75 The Maine bill would go even further,
requiring the responsible physician to be present when the patient
self-administers the lethal medication.
76
D. Physicians Who Wish Not to Participate in PAS
Consistent with the principle of individual autonomy that
underlies the argument in favor of PAS, none of the state bills
would require that a physician who receives a request for PAS
provide the patient with the means of death. The Illinois bill, for
example, includes a "Provider's Freedom of Conscience" clause,
which explicitly provides that physicians who object to PAS may
not be required to participate or aid in PAS.77
Freedom of conscience for physicians seems clearly a proper
principle for legislation that is ultimately grounded in respect for
individual autonomy. But a more difficult question is whether a
physician who receives a request for PAS and declines to fulfill
the request should have an affirmative duty to refer to the
patient to a physician who is willing. To resolve this issue, legisla-
tures must trade-off requiring a doctor who is morally opposed to
PAS to assume some complicity in the matter (even if she is
absolved from having to write the prescription herself) against
the possibility that a terminally ill requesting patient may not
have the wherewithal to locate on his own a willing physician.
The majority of bills have not imposed on conscientious
objectors an affirmative duty to refer a requesting patient; some
are silent on the question,7" while others affirmatively provide
that there is no duty to refer.79 The Wisconsin bill takes the con-
75. See H.B. 691, 90th Gen. Assembly, 1997-98 Reg. Sess. § 15(b) (Ill.
1997).
76. See Me. H.P. 663 § 5-904(k).
77. See Ill. H.B. 691 § 55; see also Me. H.P. 663 § 5-918(d) ("A health care
provider is not under a duty, whether by contract, by law or by any other legal
requirement, to provide medication to end the patient's life.. ."); Mass. H.B.
1543 § 12MM(a) ("no individual who is opposed to providing a patient with
medical means may be required to do so...").
78. See OR. REV. STAT. § 127.885(4) (1995) (providing that if a physician
refuses to grant a PAS request he must transfer "upon request" the patient's
medical records); Me. H.P. 663 § 5-918(d) (providing that if a physician refuses
to grant a patient's request for PAS and the patient transfers to the care of
another physician, the initial physician must transfer the patient's medical
records); 1997 Mich. S.B. 81 § 8(24) (same); H.B. 109, 64th Biennial Sess.
§ 5293(d) (Vt. 1997) (same).
79. See Mass. H.B. 1543 § 12MM(c).
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trary position, however, imposing on an attending physician who
declines to fulfill a request for PAS a duty "make a good-faith
attempt to transfer the requester's care and treatment to another
"180physician.., who will comply with the requester's request ....
The Washington bill appears to impose the same requirement,
although its language is somewhat less clear.81
Potentially more significant than whether individual physi-
cians may decline to provide PAS is whether hospitals or other
health care organizations can prohibit physicians who use their
facilities from providing PAS in those facilities. Here, the institu-
tion's claim to the autonomy to decline to participate in PAS can
conflict with physician's claims to the autonomy to provide PAS.
This theoretical problem is accentuated by the more practical
problem that it would often be more difficult for a patient whose
request for PAS is denied by an institution to change institutions
than it would be for a patient whose request is denied by a physi-
cian to switch physicians. On the other hand, however, if institu-
tions are permitted to opt out of PAS, terminally ill patients
would have the opportunity to pre-select health care providers
based on whether providers will or will not provide PAS.82 The
ability to select an institution that prohibits the practice could
provide peace of mind to patients (and their loved ones) who
opposed PAS but fear being subjected to an early death because
of a mistake, coercion, or loss of mental competence; the ability
to select a provider that supports PAS could increase the confi-
dence of patients who strongly favor the practice that, should
they ever request PAS, their request would be honored.
Most of the legislative proposals to date grant without com-
ment or explanation the same freedom of conscience to health
care facilities as they grant to individual providers, 83 and in so
doing fail to confront the arguments against facility freedom that
are not applicable to provider freedom. The Illinois and Massa-
chusetts bills tangentially touch on this problem by providing
that a health care facility may prohibit its staff members from
providing PAS if it gives reasonable notice of the policy to the
80. A.B. 32, 93rd Reg. Sess. § 156.07(9) (Wis. 1997).
81. See S.B. 5654, 55th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. § 11 (Wash. 1997).
82. In the Netherlands, health care facilities may opt-out of practicing
voluntary euthanasia, and it is not uncommon for hospitals or nursing care
facilities to advertise whether they will or will not provide this service. See
RIcHARD A. EPSTEIN, MORTAL PERIL: OUR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO HEmLTH CARE?
324-25 (1997).
83. See H.B. 2204, 19th Leg., Reg. Sess. §§ 1, 18(4) (Haw. 1997); H.P. 663,
118th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. §§ 5-902(g), 5-919(d) (Me. 1997); Mich. S.B. 81
§§ 8(24), 8(30) (D); see also Wash. S.B. 5654 § 14(1) (b) (health care facility may
discipline employee who acts contrary to facility's policy).
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staff members.8 4 The notice requirement is useful, but the bills
are still deficient on this issue because they do not require that
notice of a facility's "no-PAS" policy be given to patients. They
are further deficient because their text leaves unclear whether a
physician with staff privileges constitutes a "staff member" under
the statutes and can thus be prohibited by a facility from provid-
ing PAS, or whether such a physician, as an independent contrac-
tor, would be unaffected by the provision.
The Michigan ballot initiative best addresses these problems
and strikes a balance between the needs of health care facilities
and patients by permitting facilities to prohibit PAS but only if it
(1) provides notice of its policy to the public as well as its staff,
(2) transfers patients to facilities that do permit PAS within 48
hours of a patient's request for PAS, and (3) does not attempt to
prohibit its staff from providing PAS outside the facility.85
IV. THE PATIENT'S REQUEST FOR PAS
PAS legislation offers individuals the choice of ending their
lives in certain situations, thus promoting individual autonomy;
its greatest challenge is protecting the autonomy of those who do
not wish to take advantage of this option. There is nearly univer-
sal agreement that responsible PAS legislation must ensure that
decisions to opt for PAS are informed, thoughtfully considered,
and fully voluntary. The irreversible nature of PAS counsels that
legislation, in so doing, should err on the side of excessive cau-
tion. Protection of patients from PAS can come in three forms:
(1) protection from a mistake or administrative error that results
in PAS being administered by accident; (2) protection from the
coercive or undue influence of third parties who have their own
interests rather than the patients interests at heart; and (3) pro-
tection from the patient herself, who might opt for PAS out of a
lack of information or to satisfy a fleeting desire even when doing
so comes at the expense of a contrary, more stable preference for
continued life. Request procedures, waiting periods, informed
consent provisions, and witness requirements each can offer one
or more of these types of protections.
A. Request Procedures
Perhaps the most feared types of harm that can result from
the legalization of PAS are innocent miscommunications, in
which the physician mistakenly believes that the patient has
84. See H.B. 691, 90th Gen. Assembly, 1997-98 Reg. Sess. § 55(b) (Ill.
1997); Mass. H.B. 1543 § 12MM(b).
85. See Mich. Initiative §§ 5688(6) (A)-(C).
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requested PAS, and physicians taking it upon themselves to
hasten death when the patient cannot or does not request it.
Limiting right-to-die legislation to PAS, in which the patient must
self-administer the lethal dosage of medication, rather than per-
mitting active voluntary euthanasia, reduces the likelihood that
either type of harm will result in a fatality, but this precaution is
not foolproof: an elderly or ill patient is likely to take the medica-
tion that his doctor prescribes without questioning the prescrip-
tion. All of the state bills place requirements on the method of
requesting PAS and/or the number of requests required, safe-
guards which can be understood as reducing the potential for
fatal error or overreaching.
All eleven state bills provide that at least one request for PAS
made by a patient to her attending physician must be recorded
in some way. Most of the bills (Oregon, Hawaii, Maine, Michi-
gan, Nebraska,86 Vermont, Wisconsin, Massachusetts) require
that a request be made in writing. This approach provides a safe-
guard against mistaken administration of PAS, but it does so at
the risk of excluding from PAS patients too ill to place their
request in writing.87 The Connecticut, Illinois, and Washington
bills avoid this problem by providing the patient with the option
of recording her request on video tape instead of placing it in
writing." The video-tape option, which gives the patient flexibil-
ity in how to make her request for PAS without reducing the pro-
tection against error or overreaching, seems quite appropriate.
Nine of the bills (all except Connecticut and Nebraska) provide
an additional safeguard against mistaken administration of PAS
by requiring the patient to request PAS on at least two separate
occasions, 9 although all of these permit one of the requests to
be oral. It is not clear why, if at least two different requests must
86. The Nebraska bill requires an advanced directive for voluntary
euthanasia, which must be in writing. See L.B. 406, 95th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess.
§ 3(3) (Neb. 1997).
87. The Washington bill permits a patient to designate a representative to
sign the written request if the patient is unable to do so. See Wash. S.B. 5654
§ 4(4). This procedure eliminates the concern that the incapacitated will not
be able to request PAS, but it creates additional concerns as to the voluntariness
of requests.
88. See H.B. 6083, 1997 Reg. Sess. § 2(a)(3)(D) (Conn. 1997); Wash. S.B.
5654 § 4(5). The Illinois bill would permit the actual requests for PAS to be
made orally, but would require the physician to document and hold discussion
with the patient that covers all the information the patient would need to make
an- informed choice of PAS and to document that discussion either on
videotape or in a writing signed by the patient. See ll. H.B. 691 § 20(4) (C) (1).
89. The Massachusetts bill requires a request be made on three separate
occasions. See Mass. H.B. 1543 § 12EE(b) (3) (D). Wisconsin and Vermont
would require two oral requests and one written request. See H.B. 109, 64th
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be made, the bills do not require them both to be in the same
medium. If a second request is in fact an important safeguard,90
the marginal inconvenience of requiring that request to be in
writing or on videotape seems quite small.
B. Waiting Periods
Requiring that requests for PAS be made in writing or on
video tape reduces the likelihood of administrative error leading
to an unwanted administration of PAS, but this safeguard does
not protect patients from hastily electing PAS when their prefer-
ence for death might be transitory rather than stable. The nine
bills that require at least two requests for PAS attempt to mitigate
this risk by mandating a minimum waiting period between the
time that the requests are made. All but one bill require a wait-
ing period of 14 or 15 days,91 a seemingly minimal period of
enforced reflection, considering the finality of a patient's deci-
sion to choose PAS. The Washington bill is an oudier on this
issue, require a waiting period of only 72 hours between the two
patient requests that are required before a physician can pre-
scribe a lethal dose of medication.
9 2
C. Informed Consent
In attempts to insure that patient requests for PAS are not
only stable but also well-informed, all of the bills except for
Nebraska's specify certain information that must be communi-
cated by the attending physician to the patient before the
patient's request may be honored. All ten of these require that
Biennial Sess. § 5287 (Vt. 1997); A.B. 32, 93rd Reg. Sess. § 156.13(3) (Wis.
1997).
90. The second request requirement can be seen as means to require a
waiting period between the time the patient requests PAS and when it is
administered, an issue discussed below, rather than as a safeguard that protects
against involuntary PAS. However, waiting periods could be created merely by
requiring time to elapse between a single PAS request and the physician's
provision of a prescription. There is nothing inherent in the concept of waiting
periods that requires multiple requests.
91. See Ill. H.B. 691 § 15(a)(3)(D) (14 days); Mass. H.B. 1543 § 12EE(d)
(same); OR. REv. STAT. § 127.850 (1995) (15 days and at least 48 hours after the
written request is made); H.B. 2204, 19th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 11 (Haw. 1997);
H.P. 663, 118th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. §§ 5-909, 5-911 (Me. 1997) (same); Vt. H.B.
109 § 5289 (same); Wis. A.B. 32 §§ 156.07(7)(b), 156.13(3)(b) (same). The
Michigan bill states that the patient shall repeat his request for PAS "within"
(rather than "no sooner than") 15 days of the initial request, see S.B. 81, 89th
Leg., 1997 Reg. Sess. § 8(7) (Mich. 1997), but also provides that "at least 15 days
shall elapse between the patient's initial oral request and the writing of a
prescription . . . ." Id. § 8(15).
92. See Wash. S.B. 5654 § 4(3).
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the physician review with the patient her diagnosis, prognosis,
and other available medical options-the Washington bill
requires that the consulting physician do so as well.9" The major-
ity of bills also explicitly require the attending physician to review
with the patient options for palliative care including hospice
and/or pain control possibilities (Oregon, Illinois, Hawaii,
Maine, Michigan, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin)." In an
apparent attempt to ensure that this information is not only com-
municated by the physician but also understood by the patient,
many of the bills require that the patient's written request for
PAS (or videotaped request, where applicable) include a recita-
tion that the physician has discussed the required issues with
him.
9 5
While all of the bills require the attending physician to pres-
ent the patient with certain types of information that might dis-
suade her from PAS prior to granting her request, the
Massachusetts legislation is unique in requiring the attending
physician to refer the patient elsewhere for such information.
That legislation would require the physician to refer a requesting
patient to a social worker (or equivalent) "to determine whether
services are available to the patient that could improve the
patient's circumstances sufficiently to cause the patient to recon-
sider his or her request. ..96 The Illinois bill requires the physi-
cian to "offer" the patient the opportunity for this type of
consultation,97 but its language lacks the implication carried by
the Massachusetts bill that the patient must agree to the consulta-
tion before the physician may administer PAS.
93. See id. § 5(5).
94. See OR. REv. STAT. § 127.815(e) (1995); Ill. H.B. 691 § 20(1); Haw.
H.B. 2204 § 4(2)(E); Me. H.P. 663 § 5-904(c) (5); Mich. S.B. 81 § 8(9)(B)(v);
Vt. H.B. 109 § 5280(6)(E); Wash. S.B. 5654 §§ 5(2), 5(5), 5(8); Wis. A.B. 32
§ 156.07(2) (e).
95. See, e.g., Me. H.P. 663 § 5-920 (requiring that the request for PAS must
include statements that the physician has explained to the patient her
diagnosis, prognosis, alternative treatments (including hospice and comfort
care), and that the patient makes the request voluntarily and with the
understanding that she may revoke the request at any time); Haw. H.B. 2204
§ 21 (substantively identical); Mass. H.B. 1543 § 12FF(d)(3) (requiring the
responsible physician to document in writing (signed by the patient and
witnesses) or by audio or video tape (during which both the patient and the
witnesses are present) the content of his discussion with the patient of the
patient's prognosis and treatment options); Ill. H.B. 691 § 20(4)(C) (requiring
the physician to document the informed consent discussion with a writing
signed by the patient or a videotape of the discussion).
96. Mass. H.B. 1543 § 12FF(b).
97. See Ill. H.B. 691 § 20(2).
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D. Witness Requirements
All eleven bills require that the patient's written or taped
request for PAS be witnessed. Most agree that a minimum of two
witnesses must observe this request, although the Wisconsin bill
would require three and the Connecticut bill only one.9" All of
the bills specify that at least one witness (and in most cases both
witnesses) may not be entitled to "any portion" of the patient's
estate either by will or by operation of law, and all but the Wash-
ington bill specify that at least one (and in most cases both) may
not be employed by the hospital or other organization providing
care or residence to the patient.99 Nine bills would require that
at least one of the witnesses (and in most cases both witnesses)
may not be related to the patient' 0 (Connecticut and Massachu-
setts lack this restriction), and a smaller majority of the bills
would also disqualify the attending physician as a witness.10'
While the majority of bills require witnesses to observe the
patient's request, the Massachusetts and Illinois bills go further
by requiring the witnesses to observe the physician's informed
consent discussion with the patient.'0 2 This latter approach
would appear to be helpful not only in reducing the risk of
patient misunderstanding or patient/physician miscommunica-
tion, but also in assuring that the patient's choice of PAS is an
informed and considered one.
The bills diverge in their specification of what precisely the
witness must attest to, and thus, implicitly, what harms the wit-
ness requirement is intended to protect against. All of the bills
presume that the witnesses will attest that the patient actually
98. SeeWis. A.B. 32 § 156.05(l)(c).
99. See OR. Rv. STAT. § 127.810(2)(c); Haw. H.B. 2204 § 3(b); Ill. H.B.
691 § 20(4)(A); Me. H.P. 663 § 5-903(b)(1); Mass. H.B. 1543 § 12FF(d)(1);
Mich. S.B. 81 § 8(8); L.B. 406, 95th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. § 4(2) (Neb. 1997); Vt.
H.B. 109 § 5281(b); Wis. A.B. 32 § 156.05(2)(a). The Washington bill specifies
that no witness may be the attending physician or "an. employee of the
attending physician," Wash. S.B. 5654 § (4) (5) (d), but employees of hospitals
or other health care facilities are not expressly precluded from serving as
witnesses.
100. See OR. REV. STAT. § 127.810(2) (a); Haw. H.B. 2204 § 3(b). Under
the Maine, Nebraska, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin bills, neither
witness may be related to the patient. See Me. H.P. 663 § 5-903(b) (1) (i); Neb.
L.B. 406 § 4(1) (a); Vt. H.B. 109 § 5281 (b)(1); Wash. S.B. 5654 § 4(5) (a); Wis.
A.B. 32 § 156.05(2)(a)(1).
101. See OR. REv. STAT. § 127.810(3); Haw. H.B. 2204 § 3(c); Me. H.P.
663 § 5-903(b)(2); Vt. H.B. 109 § 5281(b)(4); Wash. S.B. 5654 § (4)(5)(d);
Mass. H.B. 1543 § 12FF(d) (1) (requiring that at least one of two witnesses not
be "affiliated with any person that is involved in the care of the patient").
. 102. See I11. H.B. 691 §§20(4)(A), 20(4)(C); Mass. H.B. 1543
§ 12FF(d) (1).
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made the request for PAS, but a minority also include provisions
requiring witnesses to certify that the patient's election was vol-
untary and did not result from coercion or undue influence." 3
While these provisions are laudatory in their effort to protect vul-
nerable patients from feeling pressured to "choose" PAS, the gui-
dance that they provide to potential witnesses is troublingly
vague: none specifies what would constitute "coercion," "undue
influence," or lack of "voluntariness." If a witness believes that a
patient's decision to elect PAS was influenced by the request of
emotionally or financially exhausted family members, for exam-
ple, could the witness appropriately certify that the patient was
not the subject of undue influence or coercion? The lack of clar-
ity on this point is a major weakness in all of the bills proposed to
date.
None of the proposed bills adequately addresses another
complication caused by the witness requirements: there will inev-
itably be patients who wish to request PAS who have no disinter-
ested friends to serve as witnesses. The restrictions on witness
service of relatives, individuals with a financial interest in the
patient's estate, employees of the health care organization caring
for the patient,- and the attending physician, would severely
restrict many patients' likely witness pools. This could, perhaps,
render a lack of available, qualified witnesses a fairly common
stumbling block to the administration of PAS. Restrictions that
prevent representatives of the health care organization providing
care from serving as witnesses are particularly troublesome in this
regard, as they make uncertain whether a health care provider
may even recruit disinterested non-employees to serve as wit-
nesses for PAS requests. Terminally ill patients who are bedrid-
den and do not have family or friends to call on might have few
other options for locating individuals to witness their requests.
The Oregon, Hawaii, and Maine bills partially address this
problem by providing that if the patient is a resident of long-term
care facility, the facility may designate (with some restrictions)
one of the necessary witnesses, 104 but this provision, of course,
only helps certain patients, and at best only solves "half' the
problem of locating two witnesses. The Wisconsin bill would
establish a class of persons called "patient's advocates" who may
potentially constitute all of a patient's witnesses, but this provi-
sion, too, would only apply to residents of nursing homes or
103. See Haw. H.B. 2204 § 3(a);.Me. H.P. 663 § 5-903(b); Mich. S.B. 81
§ 8(8).
104. See OR. REv. STAT. § 127.810(4); Haw. H.B. 2204 § 21; Me. H.P. 663
§ 5-903(b) (3).
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other residential-care facilities. 10 5 Although the motivations for
strict limitations on who may serve as witnesses of PAS requests
are understandable, there is no evidence that the costs associated
with such limitations have been considered in the process of
drafting existing PAS proposals. Future proposals should con-
sciously seek to balance the protection from PAS that witness limi-
tations provide against risk that preventing conflicts of interests
on the part of witnesses can also effectively deprive some patients
with strong moral claims to PAS of the procedure.
CONCLUSION
As advocates of PAS take their battle to state legislatures in
the wake of the Supreme Court's determination that the issue
should be resolved in the political rather than the legal arena,
they will have to move beyond high-level arguments for auton-
omy in life and dignity in death. Legislative recognition of PAS
must be proceeded by the resolution of a series of difficult imple-
mentation issues that PAS would create. Recent attempts to
legalize PAS by statute, along with the Oregon Death with Dig-
nity Act, can serve as a starting point for these discussions and
debates. The body of proposed legislation on the subject is help-
ful in identifying the key implementation issues; it is often far
from successful in resolving those issues at a satisfactory level of
specificity. For a PAS regime to succeed in practice, future legis-
lation must surpass the existing proposed legislation in its ability
to resolve these difficult implementation issues.
105. See Wis. A.B. 32 §§ 156.05(2)(b), 156.19.
